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Abstract
This study analyzes two monetary economies, a cash-credit good model and a
limited-participation model. In these models, monetary policy is made by a
benevolent policymaker who cannot commit to future policies. The study de-
ﬁnes and analyzes Markov equilibrium in these economies and shows that there
is no time-inconsistency problem for a wide range of parameter values. The
study originally appeared in a book, Advances in Economics and Econometrics:
Theory and Applications © 2003 by Cambridge University Press.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The history of inﬂation in the United States and other
countries has occasionally been quite bad. Are the bad ex-
periences the consequence of policy errors? Or does the
problem lie with the nature of monetary institutions? The
second possibility has been explored in a long literature,
which starts at least with the work of Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). This study seeks to
make a contribution to that literature.
The Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon literature fo-
cuses on the extent to which monetary institutions allow
policymakers to commit to future policies. A key result is
that if policymakers cannot commit to future policies, in-
ﬂation rates are higher than if they can commit. That is,
there is a time-inconsistency problem that introduces a sys-
tematic inﬂation bias. This study investigates the magni-
tude of the inﬂation bias in two standard general equilib-
rium models. One is the cash-credit good model of Lucas
and Stokey (1983). The other is the limited-participation
modelofmoneydescribedbyChristiano,Eichenbaum,and
Evans (1997). We ﬁnd that in these models, for a large
range of parameter values, there is no time-inconsistency
problem and no inﬂation bias.
In the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon literature,
equilibrium inﬂation in the absence of commitment is the
outcome of an interplay between the beneﬁts and costs of
inﬂation. For the most part, this literature consists of re-
duced-form models. Our general equilibrium models in-
corporate the kinds of beneﬁts and costs that seem to mo-
tivate thereduced-form speciﬁcations. (Forrelated general
equilibrium models, see Ireland 1997; Chari, Christiano,
and Eichenbaum 1998; and Neiss 1999.)
To understand these beneﬁts and costs, we must ﬁrst
explain why money is not neutral in our models. In both
models, at the time the monetary authority sets its money
growth rate, some nominal variable in the economy has al-
ready been set. In the cash-credit good model, this variable
is the price of a subset of intermediate goods. Here, as in
the work of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), some ﬁrms
must post prices in advance and are required to meet all
demand at their posted price. In the limited-participation
model,aportfolio choicevariableissetinadvance. Inboth
models, higher than expected money growth tends—other
things being the same—to raise output. The rise in output
raises welfare because the presence of monopoly power in
our model economies implies that output and employment
are below their efficient levels. These features give incen-
tives to the monetary authority to make money growth
rateshigherthanexpected.Thus,inﬂationclearlyhasbene-
ﬁts in these models.
Turning to the costs of inﬂation, we ﬁrst discuss the
cash-credit good model. We assume that cash good con-
sumption must be ﬁnanced by using money carried over
from the previous period. If the money growth rate is high,
the price of the cash good is high, and the quantity of cash
goods consumed is low. This mechanism tends to reduce
welfare as the money growth rate rises.
In the cash-credit good model, the monetary authority
balances the output-increasing beneﬁts of high money
growth against the costs of the resulting fall in cash good
consumption. Somewhat surprisingly, we ﬁnd that there is
a large subset of parameter values in which the costs of
inﬂation dominate the beneﬁts at all levels of inﬂation and
money growth above the ex ante optimal rate. As a result,
in this model, for these parameter values, the unique equi-
librium yields the same outcome as under commitment.
That is, there is no time-inconsistency problem and no in-
ﬂation bias.
In our limited-participation model, at all interest rates
higher than zero, increases in money growth tend to stim-
ulate employmentby reducing the interest rate.As a result,
there is no equilibrium with a positive interest rate. When
the interest rate is already zero, further reductions are not
possible. In this model, additional money generated by the
monetary authority simply accumulates as idle balances at
the ﬁnancial intermediary. The unique Markov equilibri-
um in this model has a zero interest rate. Again, there is
no time-inconsistency problem and no inﬂation bias.
Should we conclude from our results here that lack of
commitment in monetary policy cannot account for the
bad inﬂation outcomes that have occurred? We think such
a conclusion is premature. Research on the consequences
of lack of commitment in dynamic general equilibrium
models is still in its infancy. Elsewhere, in Albanesi,
Chari, and Christiano 2002, we have displayed a class of
empirically plausible models in which lack of commit-
ment may in fact lead to high and volatile inﬂation. The
key difference between the model in that work and the
models studied here lies in the modeling of money de-
mand. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that a reso-
lution of the importance of time inconsistency in monetary
policy depends on the details of money demand. As our
understanding about the implications for time inconsisten-
cy in dynamic models grows, we may discover other fea-
tures of the economic environment that are crucial for de-
termining the severity of the time-inconsistency problem.
It is too soon to tell whether the ultimate conclusion will
be consistent with the implications of the models studied
here.
The study is organized as follows. First, we analyze a
cash-credit good model with arbitrary monetary policy.
This section sets up the basic framework for analyzing
purposeful monetary policy. Interestingly, we also obtain
some new results on multiplicity of equilibria under mild
deﬂations. Next, we analyze the same model when mon-
etary policy is chosen by a benevolent policymaker with-
out commitment. Then, we analyze a limited-participation
model. Finally, we conclude.
The Basic Framework
HerewedevelopaversionoftheLucas-Stokeycash-credit
good model. There are three key modiﬁcations: we intro-
ducemonopolisticcompetition,asdoBlanchardandKiyo-
taki (1987); we modify the timing in the cash-in-advance
constraint,asdoSvensson(1985)andNicolini (1998);and
we consider nonstationary equilibria. The agents in the
modelarearepresentativehouseholdandrepresentativein-
termediateandﬁnalgoodproducingﬁrms.Apolicyforthe
monetary authority is a sequence of growth rates for the
money supply. We consider arbitrary monetary policies
and deﬁne and characterize the equilibrium. We show that
in the best equilibrium with commitment, monetary policy
follows the Friedman rule in the sense that the nominal
interest rate is zero (Friedman 1969). Following Cole and
Kocherlakota (1998), we show that there is a nontrivial
class of monetary policies that support the best equilibri-
um. We show that only one of the policies in this class is
robust; the others are fragile. Speciﬁcally, we show thatonly the policy in which money growth deﬂates at the pure
rate of time preference supports the best equilibrium as the
unique outcome. We show that the other policies are frag-









= log c1 + log c2 + log(1−n)
where c1t,c 2t, and nt denote consumption of cash goods,
consumptionofcreditgoods,andemployment,respective-
ly, in time period t.
The sequence of events in a period is as follows. At the
beginning of the period, the household trades in a securi-
ties market in which it allocates nominal assets between
money and bonds. After trading in the securities market,
the household supplies labor and consumes cash and cred-
it goods.
For securities market trading, the constraint is
(2) At ≥ Mt + Bt
where At denotes beginning-of-period tnominal assets, Mt
denotes the household’s holdings of money, or cash, Btde-
notes the household’s holdings of interest-bearing bonds,
and A0 is given. Cash goods must be paid for with money
received from securities market trading. The cash-in-ad-
vance constraint is given by
(3) P1tc1t ≤ Mt
where P1t is the period t price of cash goods. Let P1t−1 and
P2t−1 denote the period t − 1 prices of cash and credit
goods; Rt−1, the gross interest rate; and Wt−1, the wage rate
in period t − 1. The household’s sources of cash during
securitiesmarkettradingarecashleftoverfromconsuming
goods in the previous period, Mt−1 −P1t−1c1t−1; earnings on
bonds accumulated in the previous period, Rt−1Bt−1; trans-
fers received from the monetary authority, Tt−1; labor in-
come in the previous period, Wt−1nt−1; and proﬁts in the
previous period, Dt−1. Finally, the household pays debts,
P2t−1c2t−1, owed from its period t − 1 purchases of credit
goods during securities market trading. These consider-
ations are summarized in the following securities market
constraint:
(4) At = Wt−1nt−1 − P2t−1c2t−1 +( Mt−1−P1t−1c1t−1)
+ Rt−1Bt−1 + Tt−1 + Dt−1.
We place the following restriction on the household’s
ability to borrow:
(5) At+1 ≥ –(1/qt+1)
∞
j=1qt+j+1(Wt+j+Tt+j+Dt+j)






01/Rj and q0 ≡ 1.
Condition (5) says that the household can never borrow
more than the maximum present value of future income.
The household’s problem is to maximize its utility (1)
subjecttoitsrestrictions(2)–(5)andthenonnegativitycon-
straints: nt,c 1t,c 2t, 1−nt ≥ 0. If Rt < 1 for any t, this prob-
lem does not have a solution. We assume throughout that
Rt ≥ 1.
Firms
We adopt a variant of the production framework of Blan-
chard and Kiyotaki (1987). (In developing ﬁrm problems,
we delete the time subscript.) The ﬁrms in our model pro-
duce either ﬁnal goods or intermediate goods.
Ineachperiod,therearetwotypesofperfectlycompeti-















where y1 denotes output of the cash good, y2 denotes out-
put of the credit good, and yi(ω) is the quantity of the in-
termediate good of type ω used to produce good i a n d0<





for i = 1, 2. Solving this problem leads to the following
demand curves for each intermediate good:
(9) yi(ω)=yi[Pi/Pi(ω)]
1/(1−λ)
for i =1 ,2 .
Intermediate good ﬁrms are monopolists in the product
market and competitors in the market for labor. They set
pricesfortheirgoodsandarethenrequiredtosupplywhat-
ever ﬁnal good producers demand at those prices. The in-
termediate good ﬁrms solve this problem:
(10) maxyi(ω)Pi(ω)yi(ω)−Wni(ω)
for i = 1, 2, where W is the wage rate, subject to a produc-
tion technology, yi(ω)=ni(ω), and the demand curve in
(9). Proﬁt maximization leads the intermediate good ﬁrms





to the representative household. These transfers are ﬁ-
nanced by printing money. Let gtdenote the growth rate of
the money supply. Then Tt =( gt−1)Mt, where M0 is given
andMt+1=gtMt.Amonetarypolicyisaninﬁnitesequence,
gt,t=0 ,1 ,2 ,....
Equilibrium
Now we deﬁne an equilibrium, given an arbitrary speciﬁ-
cation of monetarypolicy, and discuss the best equilibrium
achievable by some monetary policy. This equilibrium is
one in which the nominal interest rate is zero. Thus, the
Friedman rule is optimal in this model. We then discuss
the set of policies that support the best equilibrium.Deﬁnitions
DEFINITION 1. A private sector equilibrium is a set of se-
quences, {P1t,P2t,Wt,Rt,c1t,c2t,nt,Bt,Mt,gt}, with the follow-
ing properties:
• Given the prices and the government policies,
the quantities solve the household problem.
• The ﬁrm optimality conditions in (11) hold.
• The various market-clearing conditions hold:
(13) c1t + c2t = nt
(14) Bt =0
(15) Mt+1 = Mtgt.
DEFINITION 2. A Ramsey equilibrium is a private sector
equilibrium with the highest level of utility.
We now develop a set of statements that, together with
(9)–(15), allow us to characterize a private sector equilib-
rium. From (11)–(12) it follows that P1t =P2t. Let Pt = P1t
= P2t. Combining the household and the ﬁrm ﬁrst-order
conditions, we get, for all t, that
(16) c2t/(1−c1t−c2t)=λ
(17) Pt+1c1t+1 = βRtPtc1t
(18) Rt = c2t/c1t ≥ 1
and
(19) Ptc1t − Mt ≤ 0
(20) (Rt−1)(Ptc1t−Mt)=0 .




The nonnegativity constraint on leisure implies that
(22) c1t + c2t ≤ 1.
We summarize these statements in the form of a prop-
osition:
PROPOSITION 1. Characterization of Equilibrium. A se-
quence,{P1t,P2t,Wt,Rt,c1t,c2t,nt,Bt,Mt,gt},isanequilibrium
if and only if (11)–(22) and P1t = P2t = Pt are satisﬁed.
Furthermore, for any Rt ≥ 1, there exists a private sector
equilibriumwithemploymentandconsumptionallocations
uniquely determined, for all t, by
(23) n1t = c1t = λ/[λ + (1+λ)Rt]
(24) n2t = c2t = Rtc1t.
Proof. Statements (16)–(22) are the resource constraints
and the necessary and sufficient conditions for household
and ﬁrm optimization. Necessity and sufficiency in the
case of the ﬁrms are obvious, and in the case of the
households, the results are derived formally in Appendix
A.
We now turn to the second part of the proposition. We
need to verify that prices and a monetary policy can be
found such that, together with the given sequence of in-
terest rates and (23)–(24), they constitute a private sector
equilibrium. First, by construction of (23)–(24), it can be
veriﬁed that (13)–(16) and (18) are satisﬁed. It can also be
veriﬁed that (22) is satisﬁed. Second, let P0 = M0/c1,0, and
use this and (17) to compute Pt, for t =1 ,2 ,3 ,....This
construction ensures that (17) for all t and (19)–(20) for
t = 0 are satisﬁed. Next, compute Mt = Ptc1t for t =1 ,
2 ,...,s othat (19)–(20) are satisﬁed for all t. Finally,
(21) is satisﬁed because 0 < β < 1 and Mt/(Ptc1t)=1 .
Q.E.D.
We use this proposition to characterize the Ramsey
equilibrium:
PROPOSITION2. Ramsey Equilibrium Yields Friedman Rule.
Any Ramsey equilibrium has the property Rt =1for all t
and employment and consumption allocations given in
(23)–(24).





t{2 log(c1t) + log Rt
+ log[1 − (1+Rt)c1t]}
wherec1tisgivenby(23)–(24).Thisproblemisequivalent
to the static problem maxR≥1f(R), where f(R) = 2 log(c1)
+ log R + log[1 − (1+R)c1], c1 = λ/[λ + (1+λ)R]. This
function is concave in R and is maximized at the corner
solution R =1 . Q.E.D.
Policies
We now turn to the set of policies that are associated with
a Ramsey equilibrium. The next proposition shows that
there is a continuum of such policies. It is the analog of
Proposition 2 of Cole and Kocherlakota (1998, p. 7).
PROPOSITION3. Policies Associated With Ramsey Equilibri-
um. There exists a private sector equilibrium with Rt =1
for all t if and only if
(26) Mt/β
t ≥κ
with κ >0for all t, and
(27) limT→∞MT → 0.
Proof.Considerthenecessityof(26)and(27).Supposewe
have an equilibrium satisfying Rt = 1 and (11)–(24). From
(18) and (16), letting ct ≡ c1t = c2t, we obtain that
(28) ct = c = λ/(1+2λ)
for all t. From (17) we obtain that
(29) Ptct = β
tP0c >0 .





so that (27) is satisﬁed. From the cash-in-advance con-
straint in (19)–(20), we know that(31) β
tP0c ≤ Mt
for each t, which implies (26).
Consider sufficiency. Suppose (26) and (27) are sat-
isﬁed and Rt = 1. We must verify that the other nonzero
prices and quantitiescan be found which satisfy(11)–(22).
Let c1t = c2t = c in (28) for all t. Let Pt = β
tP0, where P0 >
0 will be speciﬁed in theparagraphs that follow. Thesetwo
speciﬁcations guarantee (16)–(18). Condition (27), to-
gether with the given speciﬁcation of prices and consump-
tion, guarantees (21). Finally, it is easily veriﬁed that when
0<P0 ≤κ /c is set, the cash-in-advance constraint in
(19)–(20) holds for each t. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 shows that there are many policies that
implement the Ramsey outcome. However, many of these
policies are fragile in the sense that they can yield worse
outcomes than the Ramsey outcome. The next proposition
characterizes the set of equilibria associated with mild
monetary deﬂations in which the (stationary) growth rate
of the money supply satisﬁes β < g <1 .
PROPOSITION 4. Fragility of Mild Monetary Deﬂations. If β
< g <1 ,then the following are equilibrium outcomes:
• Rt =1 ,c1t = c2t = λ/[1+2λ] for all t, Pt+1/Pt = β,
and Mt/Pt →∞ .
• Rt = g/β, c1t = λ/[λ + (1+λ)g/β], c2t =( g/β)c1t,
Pt+1/Pt = g for all t, and Mt/Pt is independent
of t.
• Rt = g/β for t ≤ t*, Rt =1for t > t* for t* =0 ,1 ,
2 ,...,c1t = λ/[λ + (1+λ)Rt], c2t = Rtc1t, and
(32) Pt+1/Pt = g, for t =0 ,1 ,...,t* −1 ,for t* >0 ;
(1+2λ)g/[λ +(g/β)(1+λ)], for t = t*;
β, for t = t* +1 ,t* +1 ,....
Proof. That these are all equilibria may be conﬁrmed by
verifying that (11)–(22) are satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
This proposition does not characterize the entire set of
equilibria that can occur with β<g< 1. It gives a ﬂavor of
the possibilities, however. For example, the last outcome
above indicates that there is a countable set of equilibria
(one for each possible t*) in which the consumption and
employment allocations are not constant and the interest
rate switches down to unity after some period. Although
there do exist equilibria in which consumption and em-
ployment are not constant, these equilibria appear to be
limited. For example, it can be shown that there is no
equilibriuminwhichtheinterestrateswitchesupfromuni-
ty in some period; that is, there does not exist an equilibri-
um in which Rt* = 1 and Rt*+1 > 1 for some t*. To see this,
suppose the contrary. Then, from (17), βPt*c1t* =Pt*+1c1t*+1
= Mt*+1, since the cash-in-advance constraint must be
binding in period t*+ 1. However, Mt*≥Pt*c1t*implies that
β≥g, a contradiction. Furthermore, we can also show that
there do not exist equilibria in which the interest rate
changes and is always greater than unity, that is, in which
Rt ≠ Rt+1 ≠ 1. So, although the set of equilibria with non-
constant interest rates (and, hence, nonconstant consump-
tion) is limited, Proposition 4 indicates that it does exist.
Proposition 4 indicates that mild monetary deﬂations
are fragile. It turns out, however, that a deﬂationary policy
of the kind advocated by Friedman (1969) is robust in the
sense that it always yields the Ramsey outcome.
PROPOSITION5.RobustnessofFriedmanDeﬂation.Suppose
that gt = β. Then all equilibria are Ramsey equilibria.
Proof. To show that if gt = β, then Rt = 1, suppose the
contrary. That is, suppose that Rt > 1 for some t. There-
fore, Ptc1t = Mt. Also, Pt+1c1t+1 ≤ Mt+1. By (17) we ﬁnd
that 1/(Ptc1t)=βRt/(Pt+1c1t+1), so that (1/Mt)≥β Rt(1/Mt+1),
or gt ≥β Rt, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
It is worth pointing out that since the interest rate is
constant, so are real allocations. There is, however, a con-
tinuum of equilibria in which the price level is different. In
all of these equilibria, Pt+1/Pt = β. These equilibria are in-
dexed by the initial price level, P0, which satisﬁes P0 ≤
M0(1+2λ)/λ and Pt+1/Pt = β.
Markov Equilibrium in a Cash-Credit Good Model
In this section, we analyze a version of the cash-credit
model in which a benevolent government chooses mone-
tary policy optimally but without commitment. We ﬁnd
that time inconsistency is not a problem in this model.
The Economy
We consider a more general utility function of the constant
elasticity of substitution form:









Note that this utility function is a generalization of the one
used in the preceding section. Here, we focus on the Mar-
kov equilibrium of this model.
The timing in the model is as follows. A fraction, µ1,o f
intermediate good producers in the cash good sector and a
fraction, µ2, of intermediate good producers in the credit
good sector set prices at the beginning of the period. These
ﬁrms are referred to as sticky price ﬁrms. We show in what
follows that all sticky price ﬁrms set the same price. De-
note this price by P
e. This price, all other prices, and all
nominal assets in this version of the model are scaled by
the aggregate, beginning-of-period money stock. Then the
monetary authority chooses the growth rate of the money
supply. Finally, all other decisions are made.
The state of the economy at the time the monetary au-
thority makes its decision is P
e.
1 The monetary authority
makes its money growth decision conditional on P
e.W e
denote the gross money growth rate by G and the mone-
tary policy rule by X(P
e). The state of the economy after
the monetary authority makes its decision is S =( P
e,G).
Deﬁnitions
With these deﬁnitions of the economy’s state variables, we
proceed now to discuss the decisions of ﬁrms, households,
and the monetary authority.
Firms
Recall that proﬁt maximization leads intermediate good
ﬁrms to set prices as a markup over the wage rate; see
equations (11)–(12). Denote by ˆ P(S) the price set by the 1
−µ 1 intermediate good ﬁrms in the cash good sector and
t h e1−µ 2intermediate good ﬁrms in the credit good sector
that set their prices after the monetary authority makes its
decision; these are the ﬂexible price ﬁrms. For the µ1 and
µ2 sticky price cash and credit good ﬁrms, respectively,a n dt h e1−µ 1 a n d1−µ 2 ﬂexible price cash and credit






f o r0<λ < 1, where W(S) denotes the nominal wage rate.
In this model of monopolistic competition, output and em-
ployment are demand determined. That is, output and em-
ployment are given by (11)–(12). Let Pi(S) denote the
price of the cash and credit good for i = 1, 2, respectively.
Let yij(S), i, j = 1, 2, denote the output of the intermediate
good ﬁrms, where the ﬁrst subscript denotes whether the
good is a cash good (i= 1) or a credit good (i= 2), and the
secondsubscriptindicateswhetherthegoodisproducedby
a sticky price (j = 1) or a ﬂexible price (j = 2) ﬁrm.
The Household
In terms of the household’s problem, it is convenient to
write the constraints in recursive form. The analog of (2)
is
(36) M + B ≤ A
where, recall, A denotes beginning-of-period nominal as-
sets, M denotes the household’s holdings of cash, and B
denotesthehousehold’sholdingsofinterest-bearingbonds.
Here, nominal assets, money, and bonds are all scaled by
the aggregate stock of money. We impose a no-Ponzi con-
straint of the form B ≤ ¯ B, where ¯ B is a large, ﬁnite upper
bound. The household’s cash-in-advance constraint is
(37) M − P1(S)c1 ≥ 0
where c1 denotes the quantity of the cash good. Nominal
assets evolve over time as follows:
(38) 0 ≤ W(S)n + [1−R(S)]M − P1(S)c1 − P2(S)c2
+ R(S)A +( G−1) + D(S)−GA′
wherec2denotesthequantityofcreditgoodspurchased.In
(38), R(S) denotes the gross nominal rate of return on
bonds, D(S) denotes household proﬁts after lump-sum
taxes, and A′ denotes the next period asset holdings. Fi-
nally, B has been substituted out of the asset equation us-
ing (36). Notice that A′ is multiplied by G. This modiﬁ-
cation is necessary because of the way we have scaled the
stock of nominal assets.
Consider the household’s asset, good, and labor market
decisions. Given that the household expects the monetary
authority to choose policy according to Xin the future, the
household solves the following problem:




subject to (36), (37), (38), and nonnegativity on alloca-
tions. In (39), v is the household’s value function. The
solution to (39) yields decision rules of the form n(A,S),
M(A,S), A′(A,S), and ci(A,S), for i = 1, 2. We refer to
these decision rules, together with the production deci-
sions of ﬁrms, yij(S), for i, j =1 ,2 ,a sprivate sector allo-
cation rules. We refer to the collection of prices, P
e, ˆ P(S),
W(S), R(S), and Pi(S), for i =1 ,2 ,a spricing rules.
The Monetary Authority
Themonetaryauthority choosesthecurrentmoneygrowth
rate, G, to solve the problem
(40) maxGv(1,S)
where, recall, the state of the economy S =( P
e,G). Let
X(P
e) denote the solution to this problem. We refer to this




quires that the household and ﬁrms optimize and markets
clear.
DEFINITION 3. A Markov equilibrium is a set of private
sector allocation rules, pricing rules, a monetary policy
rule, and a value function for the household such that
• The value function, v, and the private sector
rules solve (39).
• Intermediate good ﬁrms optimize; that is, (34)
is satisﬁed, ﬁnal good prices satisfy
(41) Pi(S)=[µ i(P
e)
λ/(λ−1) + (1−µi)ˆ P(S)
λ/(λ−1)]
(λ−1)/λ
for i =1 ,2 ,and the output of intermediate good
ﬁrms, yij(S), is given by the analog of (9).
Asset markets clear; that is, A′(1,S)=1and
M(1,S)=1 .
• The labor market clears; that is,
(42) n(1,S)=µ 1y11(S) + (1−µ1)y12(S)+µ 2y21(S)
+ (1−µ2)y22(S).
• The monetary authority optimizes; that is,
X(P
e) solves (40).
Notice that our notion of Markov equilibrium has built
into it the idea of sequential optimality captured in game-
theoretic models by subgame perfection. In particular, we
require that for any deviation by the monetary authority
fromX(P
e),theresultingallocationsbetheonesthatwould
actually occur, that is, the ones that would be in the best
interests of the household and ﬁrms and would clear mar-
kets.
We now deﬁne a Markov equilibrium outcome:
DEFINITION 4. A Markov equilibrium outcome is a set of
numbers, n, c1, c2, yij (i, j = 1, 2), P
e,W ,R ,P 1, P2, and g,
satisfying n =n(1,P
e,g), c1=c1(1,P
e,g) ,...,and g =X(P
e).
Analysis
Here we characterize the Markov equilibrium. In particu-
lar, we provide sufficient conditions for the Ramsey out-
comes to be Markov equilibrium outcomes. We also pro-
videsufficientconditionsfortheMarkovequilibrium tobe
unique. Combining these conditions, we obtain sufficient
conditions for the unique Markov equilibrium to yield the
Ramsey outcomes.
In developing these results, we ﬁnd it convenient to re-
cast the monetary authority’s problem as choosing ˆ Pratherthan G. First, we analyze the private sector allocation and
pricing rules. Then, we analyze the monetary authority’s
problem.
We use the necessary and sufficient conditions of pri-
vate sector maximization and market-clearing to generate
the private sector allocation and pricing rules. The condi-
tions are given by the following:
(43) −u3/u2 = λ(ˆ P/P2)
(44) [(1/P1)−c1](R− 1 )=0
(45) R =( u1/u2)(P2/P1)
(46) ni = ci[µi(Pi/P
e)
1/(1−λ) + (1−µi)(Pi/ˆ P)
1/(1−λ)]
for i =1 ,2 ;
(47) n = n1 + n2
(48) Pi =[ µ i(P
e)
λ/(λ−1) + (1−µi)ˆ P
λ/(λ−1)]
(λ−1)/λ
for i =1 ,2 ;a n d
(49) Gu1/P1 = βRv1(1,P
e,X(P
e)).
Notice that the growth rate of the money supply, G, ap-
pears only in (49). Equations (43)–(48) constitute eight
equations in the eight unknowns, c1, c2, n1, n2, n, P1, P2,
and R. Given values for P
e and ˆ P, we see that these equa-






Replacing ˆ Pin (50) by a pricing function, ˆ P(P
e,G), we ob-
tain the allocation and pricing rules in a Markov equilib-
rium.
The pricing function, ˆ P(P
e,G), is obtained from equa-
tion (49). This equation can be thought of as yielding a
function, G(P
e,ˆ P). The pricing function, ˆ P(P
e,G), is ob-
tained by inverting G(P
e,ˆ P). It is possible that the inverse
of G(P
e,ˆ P) is a correspondence. In this case, ˆ P(P
e,G)i sa
selection from the correspondence. Any such selection im-
plies a range of equilibrium prices, ˆ P.
Given the function, ˆ P(P
e,G), the monetary authority’s
problem can be thought of in either of two equivalent
ways: either it chooses G or it chooses ˆ P. The monetary
authority’s decision problem is simpliﬁed in our setting
becauseitschoiceof ˆ Phas noimpactonfuture allocations.
As a result, the authority faces a static problem.








e)=a r gm a x ˆ P∈DU(P
e,ˆ P).
The function, P(P
e), is the monetary authority’s best re-
sponse, given P





price ˆ P, and the eight allocations and other prices just
described.Giventhesevalues,we can determine the equi-




In what follows, we assume that the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions of the monetary authority’s problem characterize a
maximum. In quantitative exercises we have done using
these models, we have found that the ﬁrst-order conditions
in the neighborhood of a Ramsey outcome do in fact char-
acterize the global maximum of the monetary authority’s
problem.
Next, we show that for a class of economies, the Ram-
sey outcomes are Markov equilibrium outcomes. Recall
that a Ramsey equilibrium is a private sector equilibrium
with R = 1. In Appendix B, we prove the following result:
PROPOSITION 6. Markov Is Ramsey. Suppose that
(53) (1–ρ)(1−µ1) ≥ µ2[(1−α)/α]
1/(1−ρ).
Then there exists a Markov equilibrium with R =1 .
Theintuitionforthispropositionisasfollows.Abeneﬁt
of expansionary monetary policy is that it leads to an in-
crease in the demand for goods which have ﬁxed prices.
This increase in demand tends to raise employment. Other
things being the same, welfare rises because employment
has been inefficiently low. A principal cost of expansion-
ary monetary policy is that it tends to reduce employment
in the cash good sector. The reason for this reduction in
employment is that nominal consumption of the cash good
is predetermined, while its price rises as a result of the in-
crease in ﬂexible intermediate good prices. It is possible
that the reduction in employment in the cash good sector
is so large that overall employment and welfare fall. In-
deed, it can be shown that if the sufficient condition of the
proposition is met, employment falls with an increase in
the money growth rate in the neighborhood of the Ramsey
equilibrium. The monetary authority has an incentive to
contract the money supply. This incentive disappears only
if the nominal interest rate is zero.
In what follows, we assume that ˆ P(P
e,G) is a continu-
ous function of G. This restriction is not innocuous. We
have constructed examples in which, for a given value of
G, there is more than one set of values of private sector
allocations and prices that satisfy the conditions for private
sector optimization and market-clearing.
2 Thus, it is pos-
sibleto construct private sector allocation and pricing rules
that are discontinuous functions of G. The assumption of
continuity plays an important role in the proof of unique-
ness given in Appendix C. In the next proposition, we
providesufficientconditionsforuniquenessoftheMarkov
equilibrium:
PROPOSITION 7. Uniqueness of Markov Equilibrium. Sup-
pose that
• ρ =0and σ =1 .
• 1−µ 1 >µ 2[(1−α)/α]
• {λ +[ γα/(1−α)]}(1−µ1) ≥ [(1−λ)γµ2]/α.
Then, in the class of Markov equilibria in which ˆ P(P
e,G)
is a continuous function of G, there exists an equilibrium
with R =1 ,and there is no equilibrium with outcome R >
1.
We conjecture that if we allow a discontinuous pricing
function, ˆ P(P
e,G), then there exist Markov equilibria with
R > 1, even under the conditions of this proposition.Markov Equilibrium in a
Limited-Participation Model
Here we analyze the set of Markov equilibria in a limited-
participation model. Our model is adapted from that of
Lucas (1990). (See Christiano 1991 and Fuerst 1992 for
similarformulations.)Inlimited-participationmodels,asset
marketfrictionsmakemoneynotneutral.Inourmodel,we
assume two kinds of frictions: the ability of households to
participate in asset markets is limited, and the source of
funds for ﬁrms to pay for labor is restricted. Speciﬁcally,
at the beginning of each period, households deposit a por-
tion of their nominal assets with a competitive ﬁnancial in-
termediary. The ﬁnancial intermediary uses these funds to-
gether with transfers from the monetary authority to make
loans to ﬁrms at a competitively determined nominal in-
terest rate. The ﬁrms use these loans to pay for their labor
input, and they pay off their loans to the ﬁnancial inter-
mediary at the end of the period with proceeds from sales.
The key frictions are, then, that households cannot change
theamountoftheirdepositswiththeﬁnancialintermediary
after the monetary authority chooses its transfers and ﬁrms
cannot use proceeds from current sales to pay workers.
The limited-participation model lets us study the set of
Markovequilibriainamodelinwhichthesourceofmone-
tary nonneutrality is quite different from that in the cash-
credit goods model with sticky prices. Interestingly, we
ﬁnd that in this model also, there is no time-inconsistency
problem.
Description of Model
We ﬁrst brieﬂy describe the model. The sequence of
events is as follows. The household starts each period
with nominal assets, and it must choose how much to de-
posit in a ﬁnancial intermediary. The monetary authority
then chooses how much to transfer to the ﬁnancial inter-
mediary. The ﬁnancial intermediary makes loans to ﬁrms,
which must borrow the wage bill before they produce.
The household makes its consumption and labor supply
decisions, and ﬁrms make production decisions. Money is
not neutral because a household cannot change its deposit
decision after the monetary authority chooses its transfer.
Let Q denote the aggregate deposits made by the rep-
resentative household, and let G denote the growth rate of
the money supply chosen by the monetary authority. In
this section, as in the preceding section, all prices and
quantities of nominal assets are scaled by the aggregate
stock of money. Let S=( Q,G) denote the state of the econ-
omy after these decisions are made.




tu(ct,nt), u(c,n) = log(c)+γ log(1−n)
where ct and nt denote period t consumption and labor, re-
spectively. We write the household’s problem recursively.
We start with the problem solved by the household after
the monetary authority has made its transfer. Let A denote
the household’s beginning-of-period nominal assets. Let q
denote its deposits. Both variables have been scaled by the
aggregate beginning-of-period stock of money. The con-
sumption, employment, and asset accumulation decisions
solve
(55) w(A,q,S) = maxc,n,M′u(c,n)+βv(A′)
subject to
(56) P(S)c ≤ W(S)n + A − q
and
(57) GA′ = R(S)[q +( G−1)] + D(S)+W(S)n
+ A − q − P(S)c.
In (55), v is the household’s value function at the begin-
ning of the next period, before the household makes next
period’s deposit decision. Also, R(S) is the gross interest
rate, P(S) is the price of the consumption good, W(S) isthe
wage rate, and D(S) is the proﬁt from ﬁrms. The choice of
q solves the following dynamic programming program:
(58) v(A) = maxqw(A,q,S
e)
where S
e is the state if the monetary authority does not
deviate from its policy decision; that is, S
e = (Q,X(Q)),
where X(Q) is the monetary authority’s policy rule.
The production sector in this model is exactly as in the
cash-creditgoodmodel,withoneexception.Topayforthe
labor that they hire during the period, intermediate good
producingﬁrmsmustborrowinadvancefromtheﬁnancial
intermediary at a gross interest rate R(S). Thus, the mar-
ginal dollar cost of hiring a worker is R(S)W(S), so that, by
the type of reasoning in the cash-credit good model, we
ﬁnd that R(S)W(S)/P(S)=λ.
The ﬁnancial intermediary behaves competitively. It
receives Q from the household and G − 1 on the house-
hold’s behalf from the monetary authority. When R(S)>
1, the ﬁnancial intermediary lends all these funds in the
loan market. When R(S) = 1, it supplies whatever is de-
manded, up to the funds it has available. We shall say that
when R(S) = 1 and demand is less than available funds,
there is a liquidity trap. At the end of the period, the ﬁ-
nancialintermediaryreturns itsearnings, R(S)(Q+G−1),to
the household. Finally, if R(S) < 1, the ﬁnancial interme-
diary lends no funds, and it returns Q + G −1t ot h e
household. Loan demand by ﬁrms is given by W(S)n(S).
Therefore, loan market-clearing requires that
(59) W(S)n(S) ≤ Q + G −1
which holds with equality if R(S)>1 .
The monetary authority’s policy function, X(Q), solves
this:
(60) X(Q) ∈ arg maxGw(1,Q,Q,G).
A recursive private sector equilibrium and a Markov
equilibrium are deﬁned analogously to those in the last
section.
Analysis of Equilibrium
It is useful to begin our analysis of equilibrium in the
limited-participation model with an analysis of outcomes
under commitment. It is easy to show, as we did earlier,
that the Ramsey equilibrium has R= 1 and can be support-
ed by a policy that sets the growth rate of the money sup-
ply equal to β. Let c*, n*, W*, R*, P*, and Q* denote this
Ramsey equilibrium. These variables solve the following
system of equations:(61) γc*/(1−n*)=W*/P*
(62) W*/P* = λ/R*
(63) R* =1
(64) W*n* = Q* + β −1
(65) P*c* = W*n* +1−Q*
(66) c* = n*.
It is straightforward to verify that the usual nonnegativity
constraints are satisﬁed. Notice that equation (61) is the
household’s ﬁrst-order condition for labor, (62) results
from ﬁrm optimization, (63) corresponds to the intertem-
poral Euler equation, (64) corresponds to money market-
clearing, (65) is the household’s cash-in-advance con-
straint, and (66) corresponds to good market-clearing.
Next, we analyze the Markov equilibria of our model.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for allocation and
pricing rules to constitute a recursive private sector equi-
librium are as follows:
(67) γn(S)/[1−n(S)] = W(S)/P(S)
(68) W(S)/P(S)=λ/R(S)
(69) W(S)n(S) ≤ Q + G −1i fR(S) ≥ 1;
0i fR(S)<1
(70) P(S)n(S)−W(S)n(S) ≤ 1−Q
where (69) holds with equality if R(S) > 1. As already
noted, if R(S) < 1, then the supply of funds in the loan
market is zero.Also, (70)holds withequality ifR(Q,X(Q))
> 1 and S = (Q,X(Q)). That is, if along the Markov equi-
libriumpaththenetinterestrateisstrictlypositive,thenthe
household’s cash-in-advance constraint is satisﬁed as a
strict equality. In a deviation from the Markov equilibrium
path, the cash-in-advance constraint must hold as a weak
inequality, regardless of the realized interest rate.
We now establish the following proposition:
PROPOSITION8. All Markov Equilibria Are Ramsey. In any
Markov equilibrium, R(Q,X(Q)) =1 ,and the allocations
and prices on the equilibrium path are the Ramsey out-
comes given in (61)–(66).
Proof. We prove this proposition in two parts. First, we
construct a Markov equilibrium in which R(Q,X(Q)) =1 .
ThenweshowthatthereisnoequilibriumwithR(Q,X(Q))
>1 .
Our constructed Markov equilibrium is as follows. Let
Q = Q*, where Q* solves (61)–(66). On the equilibrium
path, the monetary authority’s decision rule is X(Q*)=β.
The allocation and pricing rules, c(S), n(S), W(S), P(S),
and R(S), in a recursive private sector equilibrium are
deﬁned as follows. For all S, c(S)=n(S). For G ≤β , R(S)
=1 ,a n dn(S)=n*, W(S) is obtained from (69) with
equality, and P(S)=W(S)/λ. It is then easy to show that
(70) holds with inequality. For G > β the functions are
deﬁned as follows: n(S)=n*, W(S)=w*, R(S)=R* =1 ,
and P(S)=P*, where the variables with the asterisk are
those associated with the Ramsey equilibrium, (61)–(66).
Notice that these allocation and pricing rules satisfy (67),
(68), and (70) with equality and (69) with inequality.
Next we show by contradiction that there does not exist
aMarkovequilibriumwithR(Q,X(Q))>1.Suppose,tothe
contrary, that there does exist such an equilibrium. Notice
that it is always possible to construct a private sector equi-
librium for arbitrary G ≥βby simply setting (67)–(70) to
equality. Therefore, the domain of deviation that has to be
considered includes all G > X(Q). Consider such a devia-
tion. We will show that, in the private sector equilibrium
associated with this deviation, R(Q,G)<R(Q,X(Q)). This
argument is also by contradiction. Thus, suppose that
R(Q,G) ≥ R(Q,X(Q)). Then, because R(Q,X(Q)) > 1, (69)
must hold as an equality at the deviation. Substituting for
P(S) from (68) and W(S)n(S) from (69), we see that the
left side of (70) becomes
(71) [R(S)/λ−1](Q+G−1)
which is larger than [R(S)/λ−1][Q+X(Q)−1]. On the equi-
librium path, (70) must hold as an equality. Therefore, at
the deviation, (70) must be violated. We have established
that, in any deviation of the form G > X(Q), R(Q,G)<
R(Q,X(Q)). However, from (67) and (68), this raises em-
ployment toward the efficient level, contradicting mone-
tary authority optimization. We have established the de-
sired contradiction. Q.E.D.
Notice that, in the Markov equilibrium we have con-
structed, there is a liquidity trap. If the monetary authority
deviates and chooses a growth rate for the money supply
greater than β, then the resulting transfers of money are
simply hoarded by the ﬁnancial intermediary and not lent




policy? Not severe at all, according to this study. Here we
have worked with an environment that, with one excep-
tion, is similar in spirit to the one analyzed in the Kydland-
Prescott and Barro-Gordon literature. The exception is that
we are explicit about the mechanisms that cause unantici-
pated monetary injections to generate beneﬁts and costs.
Contrary to the existing literature, we have found that, in
two standard general equilibrium models, there is no in-
ﬂation bias at all.
What this means generally for the severity of the time-
inconsistency problem is too soon to know. The result
does, however, help focus future research. A comparison
of our work here and elsewhere (Albanesi, Chari, and
Christiano2002)suggests,forexample,thatwecouldlearn
something by investigating various ways to model the de-
mand for money.
*This study is reprinted, with the permission of the Cambridge University Press,
from the book, Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications,
Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume 3, edited by Mathias De-
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bridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003. © 2003 Cambridge University Press.
ThestudywaseditedforpublicationintheFederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuar-
terly Review.
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Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research.1Notice that we do not include the aggregate stock of money in the state. In our
economy, all equilibria are neutral in the usual sense that if the initial money stock is
doubled, there is an equilibrium in which real allocations and the interest rate are
unaffected and all nominal variables are doubled. This consideration leads us to focus
onequilibriawhichareinvariantwithrespecttotheinitialmoneystock.Wearecertainly
mindful of the possibility that there can be equilibria that depend on the money stock.
For example, if there are multiple equilibria in our sense, it is possible to construct
trigger strategy–type equilibria that are functions of the initial money stock. In our
analysis, we exclude such equilibria, and we normalize the aggregate stock of money
at the beginning of each period to unity.
2Speciﬁcally, we have found numerical examples in which the function, G(P
e,ˆ P),
displays an inverted U shape when graphed for ﬁxed P
ewith Gon the vertical axis and
ˆ Ponthehorizontal.Intheseexamples,eachﬁxed ˆ PimpliesauniqueG.However,there
are intervals of values of G in which a ﬁxed G maps into two distinct ˆ Ps.
Appendix A
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
for Household Optimization in the
Cash-Credit Good Model
This appendix develops necessary and sufficient conditions for
optimality of the household problem in the cash-credit good
model of the ﬁrst section of the study. These derivations are
included here for completeness. Many of the results here can be
found in the literature. See, for example, Woodford 1994.
In what follows, we assume that
(A1) P1t,P 2t,W t >0




If these conditions do not hold, there can be no equilibrium.
We begin by proving a proposition that allows us to rewrite
the household’s budget set in a more convenient form. We show
the following:
PROPOSITIONA1. Suppose (2), (4), and (A1)–(A3) are satisﬁed.
Then the constraint given in (5) is equivalent to
(A4) limT→∞qTAT ≥ 0.
Proof. It is useful to introduce some new notation. Let It and St
be deﬁned by
(A5) It ≡ Wt + Tt + Dt
(A6) St ≡ (Rt−1)Mt + P1tc1t + P2tc2t + Wt(1−nt).
Then it is straightforward to show that household nominal assets
satisfy this equation:
(A7) At+1 = It + RtAt − St.
Weestablishthat(A4)implies(5).Recursivelysolvingforassets
using (A7) and (2) from t to T yields that
(A8) qTAT ≤
T−t−1
j=0 qt+j+1It+j + qtAt −
T−t−1
j=0 qt+j+1St+j.
Taking into account qt+j+1St+j ≥ 0 and rewriting (A8), we obtain
that
(A9) qTAT ≥ qTAT −
T−t−1
j=0 qt+j+1It+j.
Fixing t, taking the limit as T→∞, and using (A4) yields (5).
We now show that (5) implies (A4). Note ﬁrst that the limit




From using this result and (5), (A4) follows trivially. Q.E.D.
Following is the main result of this appendix:
PROPOSITIONA2.Asequence,{c1t,c2t,nt,Mt,Bt},solvesthehouse-
holdproblem if and only if the following conditions are satisﬁed.
The Euler equations are
(A11) u1t/P1t = Rt(u2t/P2t)
(A12) −u3t/u2t = Wt/P2t
(A13) u1t/P1t = βRt(u1t+1/P1t+1)
(A14) (Rt−1)(P1tc1t−Mt)=0 .
The transversality condition is (A4) with equality:
(A15) limt→∞qtAt =0 .
Proof. We begin by showing that if a sequence {c1t,c2t,nt,Mt,Bt}
satisﬁes(A11)–(A15),thenthatsequencesolvesthehousehold’s
problem. That is, we show that







tu(c′ 1t,c′ 2t,n′ t)] ≥ 0
where {c′ 1t,c′ 2t,n′ t,M′ t,B′ t}
∞
t=0 is any other feasible plan. Note ﬁrst







where ui,tis the derivative of u with respect to its ith argument.
By concavity and the fact that the candidate optimal plan sat-
isﬁes (A11) and (A12), we can write (A16) as













where the equality is obtained by using the deﬁnition of St and
the second inequality is obtained by using Rt ≥ 1 and where
(1−Rt)(M′ t−P1tc′ 1t) ≤ 0; see (3). Iterating on (A7) for the two
plans, we can rewrite (A20) as
(A21) D ≥ limT→∞(u1,0/P1,0)(
T









= limT→∞(u1,0/P1,0)qT+1AT+1 ≥ 0
by (A15).
Now we establish that if {c1t,c2t,nt,Mt,Bt} is optimal, then
(A11)–(A15) are true. That (A11)–(A14) are necessary is ob-
vious.Itremainstoshowthat(A15)isnecessary.Suppose(A15)is not true. We show this contradicts the hypothesis of optimal-
ity. We need only consider the case where limT→∞qTATis strictly
positive. The strictly negative case is ruled out by the preceding
proposition. So suppose that
(A22) limT→∞qTAT = ∆ >0 .
We construct a deviation from the optimal sequence that is
consistentwiththebudgetconstraintandresultsinanincreasein
utility. Fix some particular period, τ. We replace c1τ by c1τ +
ε/P1τ, where 0 < ε≤∆/qτ. Consumption in all other periods and
c2τ are left unchanged, as well as employment in all periods. We
ﬁnance this increase in consumption by replacing Mτ with Mτ +
εand Bτwith Bτ−ε. Money holdings in all other periods are left
unchanged. Debt and wealth after t, Bt,A t,t> τ are different in
the perturbed allocations. We denote the variables in the per-
turbed plan with a prime. From (A7), we know that
(A23) A′ τ+1 − Aτ+1 =− Rτε =− ( qτ/qτ+1)ε
(A24) A′ τ+j − Aτ+j =− Rτ+j−1 ...Rτε =−( qτ/qτ+j)ε.
Multiplying this last expression by qτ+j and setting T = τ + j,we
have that
(A25) qT(A′ T−AT)=− qτε.
Taking the limit, as T→∞, we ﬁnd that
(A26) limT→∞qTA′ T = ∆ −qτε≥0.
We conclude that the perturbed plan satisﬁes (A4). However,
utility is clearly higher in the perturbed plan. We have a contra-
diction. Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Properties of a Markov Equilibrium
in the Cash-Credit Good Model
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 6, the proposition that a
Markov equilibrium in the cash-credit good model is a Ramsey
equilibrium. We establish the result by constructing a Markov
equilibrium which supports the Ramsey outcomes.
Speciﬁcally,weconstructP
e,asetofprivatesectorallocation
rules, a set of pricing rules, and a monetary policy rule, all of
which satisfy the conditions for a Markov equilibrium. In our
analysis of Markov equilibrium in this model, we have shown
that private sector allocation rules and pricing rules can equiva-
lently be expressed as functions of the growth rate of the money
supply, G, or of ˆ P, the price of the ﬂexibly priced intermediate
goods.Becausetheserepresentationsareequivalentanditiscon-











2 solve (43)−(48) with R = 1 and with
the cash-in-advance constraint holding with equality. That is,
these variables are given by
(B1) c
*













2 = P*=1 / c
*
1, and W* = λP*. Let P
e =
P*. For ˆ P > P
e, let the allocation and pricing rules solve (43)−
(48) with (44) replaced by c1 =1 / P1. For ˆ P < P
e, let the alloca-
tion and pricing rules solve (43)−(48) with R = 1. By construc-
tion, P
e and these allocation and pricing rules satisfy private
sector optimality and market-clearing. We need only check opti-
mality of the monetary authority.
Denote the derivative of U in (51) with respect to ˆ P by L,
(B3) L = u1c′ 1 + u2c′ 2 + unn′
where u1, u2, and un denote derivatives of the utility function
with respect to the cash good, the credit good, and employment,
respectively. In addition, c′ 1, c′ 2, and n′ denote derivatives of the
allocation rules deﬁned in (50) with respect to ˆ P. These deriva-
tives and all others in this appendix are evaluated at ˆ P = P
e. Let
L
+ be the right derivative and L
− be the left derivative associated
with L. We show that when our sufficient conditions are met, L
+
≤ 0 and L
− ≥ 0.
Note that
(B4) P′ i = (1−µi)
for i = 1, 2. Using (B4) and grouping terms in (B3), we obtain
that
(B5) L = u2[(u1/u2)c′ 1 + c′ 2 +( u3/u2)(c′ 1+c′ 2)]
= (1−λ)u2c1[(c′ 1/c1)+( c2/c1)(c′ 2/c2)]
because u1/u2 = R = 1 and −u3/u2 = λ, when ˆ P = P
e.
The Utility Function’s Right Derivative...
Wenow establishthat whenour sufficientconditions aremet, L
+
≤ 0. To evaluate the derivatives in (B5), we require expressions
for c′ 1/c1 and c′ 2/c2.
The ﬁrst of these is obtained by differentiating the binding
cash-in-advance constraint:
(B6) c′ 1/c1 = −(1−µ1)/P
e.
To obtain c′ 2/c2, note that the static labor Euler equation is
given by
(B7) [γc2/(1−n)](c/c2)
ρ = λ(ˆ P/P2)




taking into account d(ˆ P/P2)/dˆ P =µ 2/P2 when ˆ P= P
e, we obtain,
after some manipulations, that
(B9) [λ(1−c1)/c1 − γρ](c′ 2/c2)=λ(µ2/P2)[(1−c1−c2)/c1]
−[ λ+γρ](c′ 1/c1).
Substituting for c′ 1/c1 and c′ 2/c2 from (B6) and (B9), respec-






The denominator of (B10) is positive. To see this, use (B1) to
show that(B11) λ[(1−c1)/c1]−γρ = λ[1+(γ/λ)][(1−α)/α]
1/(1−ρ)
+ γ(1−ρ)>0





Substituting for c1 from (B1) and c2/c1 from (B2), we obtain
that
(B13) (1−c1−c2)/c2 =( γ/λ){[(1−α)/α]
1/(1−ρ) + 1}.
In addition,
(B14) (1−c1−c2)/c2 =( γ/λ){1 + [(1−α)/α]
−1/(1−ρ)}
and
(B15) (c1+c2)/c2 = [(1−α)/α]
−1/(1−ρ) +1 .
Substituting these results into (B12), we obtain that
(B16) L
+ = u2c2(1−λ)/P2{λ[(1−c1)/c1]−γρ(g/β)}





1/(1−ρ) +1 } )}.
Simplifying, we have that
(B17) L





Because the large fraction on the right side of (B17) is positive,
it follows that L
+ ≤ 0 if and only if
(B18) (1−ρ)(1−µ1) ≥ µ2[(1−α)/α]
1/(1−ρ).
. . . And Left Derivative
Next, we establish that under the sufficient conditions of the
proposition, L
− ≥ 0.
The expression for c′ 2/c2 is still given by (B9). To obtain
c′ 1/c1, we differentiate (45) with R = 1 and use (B4) to get that
(B19) [α/(1−α)](1−ρ)(c2/c1)




(B20) (c′ 2/c2)−( c′ 1/c1)=( µ 2−µ1)/(1−ρ)P
e.
Substituting for c′ 1/c1 from here into (B9) and collecting terms,




Then, using (B13), we obtain that











Uniqueness of a Markov Equilibrium
in the Cash-Credit Good Model
We prove Proposition 7, that the Markov equilibrium in our
cash-creditgoodmodelisunique,bycontradiction.Supposethat
there exists a Markov equilibrium outcome with R >1 .T h e
contradiction is achieved in two steps. First, we establish that a
deviationdownin ˆ Pcanbeaccomplishedbysomefeasibledevi-
ation in G. We then establish that such a deviation is desirable.
That a Markov equilibrium exists follows from Proposition 6.
A Deviation’s Feasibility...
Let P
e denote the expected price level in the Markov equilibri-
um, and let G
e denote the money growth rate in the correspond-
ing equilibrium outcome; that is, G
e = X(P
e). We establish that
for any ˆ P in a neighborhood, U, of P
e, there exists a G belong-
ing to a neighborhood, V, of G
e, such that ˆ P = ˆ P(P
e,G). Here,
ˆ P(P
e,G) is the price allocation rule in the Markov equilibrium.
Substituting from (45) into (49) and using the assumptions,







From the analogs of (B6) and (B9) obtained for the case g/β≥
1 and using ρ = 0, we can determine that c2(P
e,ˆ P) is a strictly
increasing function of ˆ P for ˆ P in a sufficiently small neigh-
borhood, U, of P
e. It is evident from (48) that P2 is globally
increasing in ˆ P. This establishes that G(P
e,ˆ P) is strictly increas-
ing for ˆ P ∈ U. By the inversion theorem, we know that G(P
e,ˆ P)
has a unique, continuous inverse function mapping from V =
G(P
e,U)t oU. By continuity of ˆ P(P
e,G), we know that this in-
verse is ˆ P(P
e,G) itself. This establishes the desired result.
. . . And Desirability
To show that a deviation, ˆ P < P
e, is desirable, we ﬁrst establish
properties of the private sector allocation rules and pricing rules














denote the solutions to (43)–(48) with (44) replaced by thecash-
in-advance constraint holding with equality. Let
(C3) x
b(P









denote the solutions to (43)–(48) with (44) replaced by R =1 .
Then, for any ˆ P, P
e,private sector allocations and prices must be





We now show that for all ˆ P in a neighborhood of P
e, the
private sector allocations and prices must be given by x
a(P
e,ˆ P).
Consider ˆ P = P
e. Solving (43)–(48) with (44) replaced by the
cash-in-advance constraint holding with equality and with ˆ P =
P





























e.) By continuity, for all ˆ P in
some neighborhood of P










e) = 1, it follows that ˆ Pc
b
1(ˆ P,P
e) > 1 for all ˆ P in
a neighborhood of P
e. Since the cash-in-advance constraint is
violated, x
b(ˆ P,P
e) cannot be part of a Markov equilibrium. We
have established that for ˆ P in a neighborhood of P
e, private sec-
tor allocation and pricing rules must be given by x
a(ˆ P,P
e).
With these allocation and pricing rules, the derivative of the
utility function with respect to ˆ P, evaluated at P
e = ˆ P, can be
shown to be
(C6) L ={ ( u2c2/P2)/λ[(1−c1)/c1]−γρ(g/β)}
×[ − a(g/β)+b(g/β)]
where g is the growth rate of money at the supposed outcome
and




(C8) b(g/β) = (1−λ)γµ2{(g/β)[(1−α)/α]
1/(1−ρ) +( g/β)}
+ (1−µ1)(1−λ)[λ+γρ(g/β)].
The second condition of Proposition 7, that 1 − µ1 >µ 2[(1−α)÷
α], guarantees that a(1) ≥ b(1). (It is easily veriﬁed that this is
equivalent to condition (B18).) In addition, under the ﬁrst con-
dition, that ρ= 0 and σ =1 ,a and bare linear with slopes a′and
b′, respectively, given by
(C9) a′ ={ λ +[ γα/(1−α)]}(1−µ1)
(C10) b′ = (1−λ)γµ2/α.
Given the third condition, it is trivial to verify that L < 0 for all
g/β > 1. Thus, the supposition that there is an outcome with R >
1 leads to the implication that the monetary authority can raise
utility by reducing ˆ P. This contradicts monetary authority maxi-
mization.WeconcludethattherearenoMarkovequilibriumout-
comes with R >1 .